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55 
RESIDUAL IMPACT: RESENTENCING IMPLICATIONS OF 
JOHNSON’S POTENTIAL RULING ON ACCA’S 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Leah M. Litman* 
In January 2015, the Supreme Court directed the parties to brief and 
argue an additional question in Johnson v. United States: “Whether the 
residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague.”1 The order represents 
an unusual move because the defendant had not raised the vagueness 
issue and the Court issued the order after it had already heard argument 
on the question raised in the petition for certiorari. Commentators 
therefore view the order as a signal that the Court will likely invalidate 
the residual clause.2 This decision will have been several years in the 
making: The Supreme Court has had to resolve numerous circuit splits 
over whether various state criminal convictions qualify as prior 
convictions for violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA), and Justice Scalia has been calling for the Court to invalidate 
the residual clause for the last few years.3 
A decision invalidating the residual clause would be significant for 
many reasons. The Court has not invalidated a criminal statute on 
                                                                                                                           
   * Climenko Fellow & Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Daniel 
Deacon, Richard Re, and especially Eve Primus for helpful comments. Thanks also to Paul 
Schied and the other Columbia Law Review editors for their incredible efforts and patience 
in getting this Essay to print. 
   1.  Order in Pending Case, Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (Jan. 9, 2015), 
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/13-7120_Order_1-
9-15.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
      2.  Will Baude, Supreme Court Will Consider the Constitutionality of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act, Wash. Post (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/09/supreme-court-will-consider-the-constitutionality-of-
the-armed-career-criminal-act/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting Justice 
Scalia may have gathered enough votes in support of invalidating residual clause of 
ACCA); Rory Little, Argument Preview: Are There (Finally) Five Votes to Declare the 
Residual Clause of the ACCA Unconstitutionally Vague?, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 4, 2014, 
10:50 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/argument-preview-are-there-finally-five-
votes-to-declare-the-residual-clause-of-the-acca-unconstitutionally-vague/ (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (counting at least four votes for striking down residual clause); 
Richard M. Re, Who Made a Vague Law Vague?, Re’s Judicata (Jan. 12, 2015, 10:26 AM), 
https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2015/01/12/who-made-a-vague-law-vague/ (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (predicting Justice Scalia’s argument for striking down 
residual clause will prevail). 
   3.  See infra notes 12–19 and accompanying text (discussing these cases). 
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vagueness grounds in over fifteen years, and ACCA is a flashpoint for 
many of the most pressing issues facing criminal law today—Hispanic 
and black offenders receive the ACCA enhancement at higher rates than 
white offenders do, and ACCA’s harsh mandatory minimum may lead 
many defendants to plead guilty to avoid more extensive prison time.4 
But the practical implications of the Court’s pending decision in 
Johnson will depend in part on the answer to another question—if the 
Court invalidates ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, will 
prisoners who have already been sentenced under ACCA be able to 
obtain relief? This question will become relevant not only if the Court 
ultimately invalidates the residual clause, but it also may inform the 
Court’s decision to invalidate the residual clause in the first place.5 There 
are over 6,000 federal prisoners who have been sentenced under ACCA,6 
and a favorable decision in Johnson could require many of those prisoners 
to be resentenced.7 However, various doctrines and statutes limit the 
availability of federal collateral review—that is, review that occurs after a 
defendant’s conviction has become final. The proper reading of these 
doctrines and statutes will determine whether a decision invalidating 
ACCA’s residual clause will benefit most of the currently incarcerated 
federal prisoners who were sentenced under ACCA. 
                                                                                                                           
 4. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing consequences of fifteen-
year mandatory minimum). 
 5. See Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of the Vagueness 
Doctrine, 101 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 57–58) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (noting Justices may be influenced by questions about whether 
ruling in Johnson would be retroactive). 
 6. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in 
the Federal Criminal Justice System 293 (2011) [hereinafter Mandatory Minimum 
Penalties], available at http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/ 
mandatory-minimum-penalties/report-congress-mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-
criminal-justice-system (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding 2.9% of federal 
prisoners qualified as armed career criminals under ACCA); see also Douglas Berman, 
SCOTUS Orders New Briefing and Argument on ACCA’s Constitutionality in Johnson!?!?!, 
Sentencing Law and Policy: An Affiliate of the Law Professor Blogs Network (Jan. 10, 2015, 
10:23 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/01/scotus-
orders-new-briefing-and-argument-on-accas-constitutionality-in-johnson.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting over 5,000 prisoners sentenced under ACCA); 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Statistics, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/ 
population_statistics.jsp (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 25, 2015) 
(tallying 210,736 federal inmates). 
 7. It is not clear how many prisoners were subject to the enhancement under ACCA’s 
residual clause, specifically. ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime that “is burglary, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis 
added). Johnson will only determine whether the “or otherwise involves” language is 
unconstitutionally vague, so prisoners with three or more convictions for “burglary, arson,” 
“extortion,” or a crime “involv[ing] [the] use of explosives” would not benefit from 
Johnson. 
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This Essay examines the impact a favorable decision in Johnson could 
have at the various stages of post-conviction relief for three categories of 
prisoners—prisoners whose convictions have not yet become final; 
prisoners whose convictions have become final but who have not yet filed 
a petition seeking post-conviction relief; and prisoners whose convictions 
have become final and who have already filed at least one petition 
seeking post-conviction relief. In doing so, it offers a reading of the rel-
evant cases and statutes that permits any defendant sentenced under 
ACCA to obtain relief based on a decision invalidating the residual 
clause. It also highlights some underexplored statutes and doctrinal ques-
tions courts will confront as they determine which prisoners should be 
resentenced in light of Johnson. 
Part I briefly describes the vagueness issue in Johnson and how 
Johnson will apply to prisoners whose convictions have not yet become 
final. Part II describes several judicial doctrines and statutory limitations 
imposed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
that may limit Johnson’s significance for prisoners whose convictions have 
become final. Part III describes the AEDPA provisions that may limit 
Johnson’s significance for prisoners who have already filed at least one 
petition for collateral review. Several of the doctrines and statutes are 
best read to permit any defendant sentenced under ACCA to obtain 
relief based on a favorable decision in Johnson. However, some of the case 
law is murkier, and some of the statutory provisions less clear. But even 
these doctrines and statutes permit courts to resentence incarcerated 
prisoners who were sentenced under ACCA, and that is how the 
doctrines and statutes should be read. 
I. GROUP ONE: PRISONERS ON DIRECT REVIEW 
The Court has previously attempted to address the vagueness issue 
posed by ACCA’s residual clause, but there now appears to be a real 
possibility that five Justices are inclined to find the residual clause 
unconstitutionally vague.8 If this occurs, the implications for resent-
encing are clearest for those prisoners whose convictions have not yet 
become final: Those prisoners will be able to obtain relief based on a 
favorable decision in Johnson. 
A. Vagueness 
The void for vagueness doctrine is well established. A criminal law is 
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to “define the criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct 
                                                                                                                           
 8. See Little, supra note 2 (noting potential shift of Justices toward striking down re-
sidual clause). 
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is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”9 
The Court is poised to decide whether ACCA’s residual clause is void 
for vagueness. ACCA imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence on defendants convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm un-
der § 922(g) who have three or more convictions for “violent felonies.” 
ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime that “is burglary, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pre-
sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”10 The “residual 
clause” refers to the text beginning “or otherwise.”11 James v. United States 
directed courts to determine whether a conviction falls within the re-
sidual clause by using the “categorical approach.”12 Under the 
categorical approach, courts “consider[] whether the elements of the offense 
are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the residual 
provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of th[e] particular 
offender.”13 
It is not hard to imagine an opinion invalidating ACCA’s residual 
clause as unconstitutionally vague. Indeed, in several dissents, Justice 
Scalia has essentially written the opinion already.14 Since James, the Court 
has taken a case involving the proper interpretation of the residual 
clause nearly every other term.15 Although the Court has attempted to 
put different clarifying glosses on ACCA’s residual clause, none has pro-
ven particularly effective. Begay v. United States suggested that a crime falls 
within ACCA’s residual clause where the crime is typically committed in a 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive manner,”16 but United States v. Sykes 
maintained instead that the residual clause focuses primarily on “levels of 
risk.”17 Beginning in James, Justice Scalia indicated that he was inclined to 
find the residual clause unconstitutionally vague because the categorical 
approach “is almost entirely ad hoc.”18 Since then, Justice Scalia has 
seized on the Court’s failure to clarify the residual clause: “What sets 
ACCA apart . . .—and what confirms its incurable vagueness—is our re-
peated inability to craft a principled test out of the statutory text.”19 
                                                                                                                           
 9. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
 11. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 124 (2009). 
 12. 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
James, 550 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 15. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2267; Chambers, 555 U.S. at 122; Begay v. United States, 553 
U.S. 137 (2008). 
 16. 553 U.S. at 145. 
 17. 131 S. Ct. at 2275. 
 18. 550 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 19. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Re, supra note 2 (sug-
gesting Court’s opinions construing residual clause made it vague). While the reason some 
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B. Prisoners on Direct Review 
A decision invalidating ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally 
vague will apply in any case where the prisoner’s conviction has not yet 
become final. It is black-letter doctrine that “new” rules apply to criminal 
cases that have not yet become final.20 Finality occurs when a prisoner 
has exhausted his direct appeal in the federal court of appeals and the 
Supreme Court has denied a petition for certiorari or the time to file a 
petition for certiorari has expired.21 It is hard to know exactly how many 
ACCA offenders’ convictions have not yet become final. Sentencing re-
ports indicate that, in a given year, almost 600 defendants will be eligible 
for the ACCA sentencing enhancement.22 It takes, on average, slightly 
less than a year and a half for a defendant’s conviction to become final: 
Once the sentencing court enters judgment, the defendant has two 
weeks to file an appeal;23 the courts of appeals take, on average, a year to 
decide a case once an appeal has been filed;24 and defendants have nine-
ty days after the court of appeals’ entry of judgment to file a petition for 
certiorari.25 These numbers suggest that a decision holding ACCA’s resid-
ual clause unconstitutionally vague could apply to around 900 prisoners 
whose convictions have not yet become final (the 600 sentenced this past 
year, plus the 300 sentenced in the latter half of the previous year). 
Even if a defendant has not previously argued that ACCA’s residual 
clause is unconstitutionally vague, the defendant could still obtain relief 
by making the argument for the first time on appeal or in a petition for 
certiorari. Federal courts may review claims not previously argued for 
“plain error,” meaning errors “that affect[] substantial rights.”26 The mis-
taken imposition of a fifteen-year mandatory minimum clearly affects a 
defendant’s substantial rights by resulting in a mandatory period of in-
carceration that judges may not reduce.27 All of the courts of appeals that 
                                                                                                                           
Justices changed their views on ACCA may remain a mystery, every ACCA case the Court 
took increasingly confirmed Justice Scalia’s claim that ACCA was either incurably vague or 
that the Court had made it so. Given the timing of the order (three months after the case 
was argued), the draft opinions in Johnson may also have helped his case. 
 20. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1986) (“But after we have decided a 
new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that 
rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.”). 
 21. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011) (“Finality occurs when direct state ap-
peals have been exhausted and a petition for writ of certiorari from this Court has become 
time barred or has been disposed of.”). 
 22. Mandatory Minimum Penalties, supra note 6, at 282–83. 
 23. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). 
 24. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Courts of Appeals-Median Time Interval, tbl.B-4, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/appendices/ 
B04Sep10.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 25. Sup. Ct. R. 13. 
 26. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 27. See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (holding error affects 
defendant’s “substantial rights” if it “affected the outcome of the district court proceed-
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have addressed the issue agree that errors regarding ACCA’s interpreta-
tion or ACCA’s application affect defendants’ substantial rights; there-
fore, errors regarding ACCA’s validity—i.e., ACCA’s lawful application—
do as well.28 
II. GROUP TWO: PRISONERS ON FIRST COLLATERAL REVIEW 
What about prisoners whose convictions have become final? 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 authorizes federal prisoners to file petitions for collateral 
review after their convictions have become final. Three rules—two ju-
dicial doctrines (retroactivity and procedural default) and one statutory 
provision (the statute of limitations)—could potentially limit whether 
prisoners whose convictions have become final, but who have not yet 
filed a petition for review under § 2255, are able to obtain relief based on 
a decision holding ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague. The 
case law on retroactivity largely points in one direction: The decision in 
Johnson will apply retroactively on collateral review. And because AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations borrows from the rules for retroactivity, the statute 
of limitations will not pose a bar to prisoners who file a petition for 
collateral review within one year of Johnson. The doctrine on procedural 
default, however, is much less clear. The cases do not foreclose the pos-
sibility that prisoners will be able to obtain relief based on Johnson, and 
some cases even affirmatively support that idea. And, this section argues, 
the equitable roots of procedural default suggest the doctrine should be 
read to permit prisoners sentenced under ACCA to obtain relief based 
on Johnson on collateral review. 
A. Retroactivity 
Under Teague v. Lane, “new constitutional rules of criminal pro-
cedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final 
before the new rules are announced.”29 Although subsequent cases have 
applied the retroactivity analysis to decisions interpreting the scope of 
criminal statutes,30 a decision invalidating ACCA’s residual clause as void 
for vagueness would be a constitutional decision, albeit invalidating a 
                                                                                                                           
ings”); infra note 28 (listing cases finding defendant’s substantial rights affected by errors 
in ACCA’s application). 
 28. E.g., United States v. Smith, 448 F. App’x 340, 342 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding district 
court’s conclusion that conviction qualified as violent felony was plain error affecting de-
fendant’s substantial rights); United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 116–17 (1st Cir. 
2011) (same); United States v. High, 576 F.3d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding district 
court’s conclusion that conviction qualified as violent felony was plain error); United 
States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2009) (same where conclusion was for pur-
poses of career offender guideline); United States v. Heikes, 525 F.3d 662, 664 (8th Cir. 
2008) (finding district court’s conclusion that conviction qualified as violent felony was 
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights). 
 29. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
 30. E.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004). 
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criminal statute. Teague initially established two exceptions to the general 
rule against applying new rules on collateral review: New rules apply 
retroactively on collateral review where the rules “place certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
law-making authority to proscribe” or require “procedures . . . implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.”31 Subsequent cases have clarified the first 
exception means that all new “substantive” rules apply retroactively, 
“includ[ing] decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by 
interpreting its terms.”32 A rule is substantive if it creates “‘a significant 
risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not 
make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon 
him.”33 A decision that “modifies the elements of an offense is normally 
substantive rather than procedural.”34 
A favorable decision in Johnson would be substantive and therefore 
retroactively applicable to prisoners who were sentenced under ACCA. 
But it will not be retroactively applicable to prisoners who were 
sentenced under the analogous career offender guideline. 
1. Prisoners Sentenced Under ACCA. — A decision invalidating ACCA’s 
residual clause would be substantive and therefore should apply retro-
actively to defendants sentenced under ACCA whose convictions have 
already become final. The ACCA enhancement requires additional years 
of imprisonment, and this results in a real substantive liability. Without 
the ACCA enhancement, the statutory maximum term of imprisonment 
for a conviction under § 922(g) is ten years, whereas with the enhance-
ment, the statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is fifteen 
years.35 A decision finding the residual clause invalid would mean that 
defendants subjected to the enhancement received “a punishment the 
law c[ould] not impose on” them—a term of years exceeding the stat-
utory maximum for the offense they were convicted of. A decision hold-
ing the residual clause unconstitutionally vague would also “narrow the 
scope of a criminal statute” by reducing the applicable penalties for 
§ 922(g) convictions. Therefore, a decision invalidating ACCA’s residual 
clause would be substantive and apply retroactively on collateral review. 
It should not matter for retroactivity purposes that a decision inval-
idating ACCA’s residual clause would not change what conduct the law 
proscribes—§ 922(g) would still criminalize certain individuals pos-
sessing a firearm. The Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence helps to 
show why a decision invalidating a mandatory sentencing enhancement 
would be substantive. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Sixth Amendment 
requires a jury to determine whether a defendant has committed each 
                                                                                                                           
 31. 489 U.S. at 307. 
 32. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52. 
 33. Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
 34. Id. at 354. 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012). 
62 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR [Vol. 115:55 
 
element of an offense.36 And the Court has held that “any fact that 
increases the mandatory minimum” sentence is, in effect, an “element” 
of an offense.37 The Court reasoned that “a fact triggering a mandatory 
minimum . . . produces a new penalty” and thus “constitute[s] a new, 
aggravated crime.”38 A decision altering the defendant’s eligibility for a 
mandatory minimum sentence therefore alters the “elements of the 
offense” and, for that reason, should be considered substantive for 
purposes of retroactivity analysis.39 
Additionally, the result of a favorable decision in Johnson would be 
that a defendant convicted under § 922(g) could not be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment exceeding ten years. The decision would mean 
that defendants sentenced under ACCA were given a punishment (more 
than ten years’ imprisonment) that the law, as written, cannot impose on 
them. 
The reasons why the void for vagueness doctrine applies to the 
ACCA sentencing enhancement also suggest statutory sentencing 
enhancements, and specifically mandatory minimum sentences, are 
substantive in important respects. The void for vagueness doctrine 
ordinarily ensures that individuals receive “fair notice of what is 
prohibited.”40 But if the Court invalidates the residual clause on void for 
vagueness grounds, it will be because fair-notice principles also require 
individuals to know what punishment the law establishes for their 
offense—or at least, what minimum punishment a judge is required to 
impose for their offense of conviction. Therefore, merely applying the 
                                                                                                                           
 36. 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10, 490 (2000). 
 37. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2158 (2013). 
 38. Id. at 2160–61. 
 39. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 354. Almendarez-Torres v. United States held that a defendant’s 
prior conviction does not count as an element of the offense for Sixth Amendment purposes 
and thus the fact of a prior conviction need not be found by a jury, even where that 
conviction increases the defendant’s sentence. 523 U.S. 224, 243–47 (1998). But Almendarez-
Torres was decided before many of the Court’s more recent cases applying Apprendi. See, 
e.g., Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2157–58 (2013); S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2344, 2349–50 (2012); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005); Blakeley v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–03 (2004). Facts that increase a defendant’s sentence may 
also be considered substantive for other purposes, even if they are not considered substantive 
elements of the offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. For example, Peugh v. United 
States held that advisory guidelines, which are not considered substantive for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment, are substantive laws for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 133 S. Ct. 
2072, 2081–85 (2013). And Schriro suggests prior convictions that increase a defendant’s 
sentence might count as substantive elements of an offense for purposes of retroactivity—
in Schriro, one of the statutory aggravating factors that increased the defendant’s sentence to 
a capital sentence was his prior convictions. 542 U.S. at 351 n.3. 
 40. E.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). 
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void for vagueness doctrine to ACCA suggests the statutory minimum 
punishment for an offense is substantive in key respects.41 
The court of appeals cases support the conclusion that a decision in-
validating the residual clause would be substantive and therefore re-
troactively applicable on collateral review.42 Indeed, every circuit that has 
addressed the issue has concluded that Supreme Court decisions nar-
rowing the scope of ACCA’s residual clause apply retroactively on col-
lateral review.43 
2. Prisoners Sentenced Under Career Offender Guideline. — A favorable 
decision in Johnson will not apply retroactively to prisoners who were sen-
tenced under the career offender guideline of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines suggest recommended 
sentencing ranges based on the defendant’s conduct and characteristics. 
Federal judges first calculate the sentencing range recommended by the 
Guidelines, and then choose a sentence to impose, but judges are not 
required to impose a sentence within the recommended guidelines 
range. One particular sentencing guideline—the career offender 
                                                                                                                           
 41. See also infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (explaining why changes in 
criminal law mean doctrines should focus on what punishment is authorized rather than 
exclusively on what conduct is prohibited). 
 42. In Johnson v. Ponton, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which held that juveniles convicted of 
homicide cannot be sentenced to life without parole, was not substantive and therefore 
not retroactively applicable on collateral review. No. 13–7824, 2015 WL 924049, at *1 (4th 
Cir. Mar. 5, 2015). Johnson reasoned that Miller was not substantive because it “[did] not 
foreclose” the possibility that a juvenile could serve life without parole. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2469. But the mere possibility that a decision allows some hypothetical offender to receive 
a particular sentence does not mean a rule is not substantive; otherwise any rule inter-
preting the scope of a criminal statute is not substantive—Congress could just rewrite the 
statute to criminalize the conduct. But see Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52 (stating decisions 
narrowing scope of criminal statute apply retroactively). See also supra notes 29–34 and ac-
companying text (explaining why doctrines should allow for relief in cases finding 
sentencing enhancements invalid); infra notes 57–66 and accompanying text (same). 
Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning seems to be that Miller did not foreclose the pos-
sibility that the specific defendant before the court could end up with a life-without-parole 
sentence for the offense he has already committed. But a favorable decision in Johnson 
would “foreclose” a sentencer’s ability to impose more than ten years’ imprisonment for a 
defendant’s prior § 922(g) conviction because Congress may not impose additional 
penalties for previous convictions under § 922(g). Thus, a favorable decision in Johnson 
forecloses the possibility that prisoners sentenced under the current versions of § 922(g) 
and § 924(e) may receive more than ten years’ imprisonment. 
 43. E.g., Jones v. United States, 689 F.3d 621, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding sub-
stantive rules that narrow scope are retroactively applicable); Welch v. United States, 604 
F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 
2009) (same); cf. Miller v. United States, 735 F.3d 141, 147 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding Fourth 
Circuit opinion interpreting ACCA’s scope retroactively applicable); Lindsey v. United 
States, 615 F.3d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district court erred when it held Begay 
did not apply retroactively.”). United States v. Montes, 570 F. App’x 830, 831 (10th Cir. 
2014), held Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), not retroactive, but on the 
ground that it was not a “new” rule and was a mere application of existing precedent. 
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guideline—results in higher recommended sentencing ranges for 
offenders with three or more convictions for violent felonies,44 and de-
fines “crimes of violence” using the same language as ACCA.45 Courts 
interpret the phrase violent felony to mean the same thing under the 
Guidelines as under ACCA.46 
Because the Guidelines are merely recommendations, they are less 
“substantive” than ACCA’s statutory minimum sentencing enhancement. 
The application of the career offender guideline, unlike the application 
of ACCA, does not necessarily alter the prescribed range of sentences to 
which a criminal defendant is exposed.47 And under the Court’s Sixth 
Amendment sentencing jurisprudence, a fact that increases a defendant’s 
sentence is an element of the offense only where the existence of that 
fact requires a judge to sentence a defendant to more time, not where it 
merely recommends that the judge do so.48 Additionally, defendants 
sentenced under the career offender guideline may not have necessarily 
received a sentence that exceeds the term of imprisonment that is 
authorized by statute for their offense of conviction.49 Thus, as to these 
defendants, a decision in Johnson does not mean they received a sentence 
that the law cannot impose on them, or a sentence unauthorized by law. 
Most district courts have thus concluded that decisions interpreting 
ACCA are not retroactive, but only as to prisoners sentenced under the 
career offender guideline.50 
                                                                                                                           
 44. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2014). 
 45. Compare id. § 4B1.2(a) (defining “crime of violence” as having element of phys-
ical force against another or is otherwise one of denoted crimes listed in section), with 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012) (utilizing substantially same language to define “violent 
felony”). 
 46. E.g., United States v. Ruvulcaba, 627 F.3d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e apply 
the same analysis to determine whether a crime is a violent felony under the Armed 
Career Criminal Act and to determine whether a crime is a crime of violence under the 
Guidelines.”); United States v. Partee, 373 F. App’x 602, 603 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The term ‘vi-
olent felony’ under the ACCA and ‘crime of violence’ under the career offender guideline 
are nearly identical, and we apply the same interpretation to both provisions when deter-
mining whether a prior conviction triggers increased penalties.”). 
 47. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013). 
 48. Id.; see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 223 (2005) (“If the Guidelines . . . 
could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the 
selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts . . . [they] would not 
implicate the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 49. See infra note 73 (discussing cases where defendants sentenced under career of-
fender guideline received sentence below statutory maximum for offense of conviction). 
 50.  E.g., United States v. Ross, No. 06-cr-132-jcs, 2010 WL 148397, at *2 (W.D. Wis. 
Jan. 12, 2010) (finding Begay and Chambers not retroactive to interpretations of career of-
fender guideline based on prior district court opinion); United States v. Holt, 677 F. Supp. 
2d 1063, 1065 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (finding Begay and Chambers not retroactively applicable to 
interpretations of career offender guideline); United States v. Johnson, No. 04-269, 2009 
WL 2611279, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2009) (finding Begay not retroactively applicable to 
interpretations of career offender guideline); United States v. Campbell, No. 6:06-812-
HMH, 2009 WL 1254287, at *4 (D.S.C. May 1, 2009) (same); cf. Cadieux v. United States, 
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B. Procedural Default 
The doctrine of procedural default bars consideration of a claim on 
collateral review where the defendant could have, but did not raise the 
claim on direct appeal.51 Procedural default may affect two kinds of pri-
soners: (1) prisoners who have been sentenced under ACCA, and (2) pri-
soners sentenced under the separate, career offender guideline.52 With 
respect to prisoners sentenced under ACCA, the doctrine is slightly 
unclear and largely boils down to two issues. One is whether prisoners 
sentenced under ACCA should be viewed as “actually innocent” of some-
thing in light of Johnson. Two is whether federal courts would (and could) 
find that it is a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” for prisoners to re-
ceive a sentence above the statutory maximum for their offense of con-
viction. With respect to prisoners sentenced under the career offender 
guideline, the doctrine is clearer—these prisoners will not be able to ob-
tain relief based on a favorable decision in Johnson. 
1. Prisoners Sentenced Under ACCA. — Several courts have invoked 
procedural default to decline to reach claims that a defendant’s prior 
convictions were mistakenly classified as violent felonies in light of sub-
sequent cases.53 However, some courts justify applying procedural default 
on the ground that federal collateral review is rarely available for “non-
constitutional error[s]”54 such as the proper interpretation of “violent 
felony.”55 If the purpose of procedural default in federal collateral review 
is to limit collateral proceedings to claims of constitutional error, courts 
may choose not to use procedural default to bar claims that ACCA is un-
constitutionally vague. However, most courts maintain that procedural 
default bars consideration of any claim whose “‘merits can be reviewed 
without further factual development.’”56 Because no factual development 
                                                                                                                           
No. 03-41-B-W, 2009 WL 1286421, at *7 (D. Me. May 8, 2009) (finding First Circuit opin-
ion interpreting ACCA not intended to be retroactively applicable to defendant sentenced 
under ACCA). See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text for a description of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
 51. E.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982) (“Under this standard, 
to obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to which no contemporaneous objection 
was made, a convicted defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double pro-
cedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he com-
plains.”); Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Because col-
lateral review is not a substitute for a direct appeal, the general rule[] ha[s] developed 
that . . . a defendant must assert all available claims on direct appeal.”). 
 52. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text for a description of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
 53. See, e.g., McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11th Cir. 2011) (defendant 
procedurally defaulted claim that he was improperly sentenced under career offender 
guideline); United States v. Gibson, 424 F. App’x 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); United 
States v. Coley, 336 F. App’x 933, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2009) (same). 
 54. E.g., Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232. 
 55. E.g., Hunter v. United States, 559 F.3d 1188, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 56. E.g., Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1233 n.14 (quoting Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 
1055 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
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is required to review the claim that ACCA’s residual clause is uncon-
stitutionally vague, most courts will find that a defendant procedurally 
defaulted the claim if the defendant did not make the argument on 
appeal. 
This is not the end of the matter, because courts will hear a pro-
cedurally defaulted claim if the defendant establishes “cause” and “pre-
judice.”57 The additional term of years resulting from ACCA’s mandatory 
sentencing enhancement constitutes prejudice;58 therefore, these cases 
will turn on whether the defendant has established “cause.” Traditionally, 
“cause” has included only instances where the claim’s sheer novelty 
meant there was no legal basis for raising the claim before, or where the 
claim was so obvious that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for fail-
ing to raise it.59 This standard will not be of much use to prisoners seek-
ing to make use of Johnson.60 The claim’s legal basis is hardly novel: 
Justice Scalia has been suggesting ACCA is unconstitutionally vague for 
the last eight years, and the void for vagueness doctrine is nothing new. 
Courts are also unlikely to find that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue that ACCA was unconstitutionally vague because circuit precedent 
foreclosed the argument—every circuit has rejected the claim that 
ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.61 The fact that case 
law foreclosed the argument that ACCA is unconstitutionally vague does 
                                                                                                                           
 57. E.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). 
 58. E.g., United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 669 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is beyond cavil 
that imprisonment for an additional 52 months . . . constitutes prejudice.”); cf. Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012) (“[I]neffective assistance of counsel during a sen-
tencing hearing can result in Strickland prejudice because ‘any amount of [additional] jail 
time has Sixth Amendment significance.’” (quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 
203 (2001))). 
 59. E.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (“[A] a claim that ‘is so 
novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel’ may constitute cause for a 
procedural default . . . .” (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984))); Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (“So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose per-
formance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. 
Washington, we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that 
results in a procedural default.” (citation omitted)). 
 60. Cf., e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective 
Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims in State and Federal Postconviction Proceedings, 24 
Crim. Just. 6, 8–10 (2009) (suggesting many claims fall somewhere in between being so no-
vel that counsel could not have predicted or made them and being so obvious that counsel 
was ineffective for raising them). 
 61. E.g., United States v. Van Mead, 773 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Johnson, 526 F. App’x 708 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Hawkins, 512 F. App’x 746 
(10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brown, 516 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Guadalupe, 493 F. App’x 146 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Battle, 494 F. App’x 404 (4th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Devo, 457 
F. App’x 908 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Wilson, 64 F. App’x 417 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Powell, 967 F.2d 595 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
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not excuse counsel’s failure to make it—perceived futility to raising a 
claim does not provide cause to excuse a procedural default.62 
There is, however, another circumstance where courts hear proce-
durally defaulted claims: fundamental miscarriages of justice.63 The pre-
cise scope of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is unclear. 
At the very least, the exception includes cases where a defendant estab-
lishes he is actually innocent.64 It is less clear whether a defendant who 
cannot establish he is actually innocent could nonetheless establish there 
has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice excusing his procedural 
default.65 Read carefully, however, the relevant decisions suggest courts 
could, and probably should, find defendants sentenced under ACCA 
have established “cause” and “prejudice” for their default, either because 
the defendants are actually innocent in light of Johnson, or because a 
sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction 
is a fundamental miscarriage of justice.66 
The Supreme Court’s cases on the actual innocence exception could 
be read to suggest the actual innocence exception is available to defen-
dants seeking to establish they are innocent of or ineligible for the 
sentence they received. Schlup v. Delo held that a claim of actual 
innocence could excuse a defendant’s procedural default where the 
defendant established he “probably” did not commit the underlying 
offense.67 Sawyer v. Whitley held that a defendant could establish actual 
innocence, thus excusing a procedural default, if the defendant 
established by “clear and convincing evidence” that he was ineligible for 
a capital sentence, even where he committed the underlying offense.68 In 
Sawyer, state law provided that defendants could be sentenced to death 
where the state established certain “statutory aggravating circumstances.” 
And Sawyer held that where there is clear and convincing evidence that a 
statutory aggravating circumstance was inappropriately applied, the 
defendant is ineligible for or innocent of the death sentence and there 
has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice.69 Sawyer’s reasoning could 
                                                                                                                           
 62. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986). Put another way, the claim is neither 
so novel that counsel could not have conceived of it (thus excusing the defendant from 
raising it), nor so obvious that counsel was inept and thus constitutionally ineffective for 
not making it (thus establishing cause to excuse the procedural default). 
 63. E.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 172 (1982). 
 64. Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th Cir. 2014); Hawkins v. United 
States, 706 F.3d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 2013); Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 275, 282 (4th Cir. 2010); 
Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 65. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing cases on this question). 
 66. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing cases finding defendants 
sentenced under ACCA either actually innocent or victims of fundamental miscarriage of 
justice). 
 67. 513 U.S. 298, 323–24 (1994). 
 68. 505 U.S. 333, 344–45 (1992). 
 69. Id. 
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apply to defendants sentenced under the residual clause: A favorable 
decision in Johnson would mean that there will be no evidence that 
ACCA’s statutory mandatory minimum applied to defendants sentenced 
under the residual clause. Thus, these defendants are ineligible for or 
innocent of more than ten years’ imprisonment, and therefore there has 
been a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
But Sawyer involved a death sentence, and it is unclear whether de-
fendants may be actually innocent of noncapital sentences as well as cap-
ital ones.70 Several courts of appeals have suggested a prisoner is not ac-
tually innocent where he establishes he was improperly subjected to the 
career offender guideline in light of subsequent precedent, and some of 
these cases contain broad statements that the actual innocence exception 
is categorically unavailable for sentencing errors that result in a non-
capital sentence.71 But, on closer inspection, these cases do not actually 
decide whether defendants convicted under § 922(g) (for unlawful pos-
session of a firearm) may establish actual innocence, thus excusing a pro-
cedural default. All but one of the cases finding the actual innocence ex-
ception inapplicable did not involve defendants convicted under 
§ 922(g).72 More importantly, in all of these cases, the defendant ultim-
ately received a sentence below the statutory maximum for the de-
fendant’s offense of conviction: The mistaken application of the 
Guidelines did not result in the defendant receiving a sentence that ex-
ceeded the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.73 By con-
trast, a favorable decision in Johnson will mean that prisoners who have 
been convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm under § 922(g) and 
sentenced under the residual clause will have received a sentence that 
exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction. Without 
the ACCA enhancement, the statutory maximum for a § 922(g) con-
                                                                                                                           
 70. The Court granted certiorari in Dretke v. Haley to decide whether the actual in-
nocence exception to procedural default applied to claims that resulted in mistaken non-
capital sentences, but ultimately resolved the case on other, narrower grounds. 541 U.S. 
386, 388–89 (2004) (“[T]he question before us is whether this exception applies where an 
applicant asserts ‘actual innocence’ of a noncapital sentence. Because the District Court 
failed first to consider alternative grounds for relief . . . that might obviate any need to 
reach the actual innocence question, we vacate . . . and remand.”). 
 71. United States v. Nichols, 472 F. App’x 856, 857 (10th Cir. 2012) (“A defendant, 
however, cannot be actually innocent of a non-capital sentence.”). 
 72. See infra note 79, and text accompanying notes 92–93 (listing cases that did not 
involve defendants convicted under § 922(g) and describing lone exception). 
 73. Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 182 (4th Cir. 2014) (controlled 
substances violation with statutory maximum of forty years and sentenced to seventeen 
and a half years); Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1142 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(controlled substances violation with statutory maximum of twenty years and sentenced to 
fewer than thirteen years); Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 822 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(assault with weapon with statutory maximum of twenty years and sentenced to nineteen 
years); Sun Bear v. United States 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (second-
degree murder with statutory maximum of life and sentenced to thirty years). 
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viction is ten years,74 and with the enhancement the statutory minimum 
is fifteen years.75 
Indeed, the relevant cases contain statements that generally support 
the idea that a defendant may be actually innocent, thus excusing a pro-
cedural default, if he was improperly sentenced to a mandatory mini-
mum sentence. In every single one of the cases involving the career of-
fender guideline, the courts suggested the defendant would be actually 
innocent if a sentencing error resulted in the defendant receiving a sen-
tence above the statutory maximum for the defendant’s offense of con-
viction.76 The cases reason that where “[a] sentence . . . violates a stat-
ute”—such as where a defendant receives a sentence that exceeds the 
statutory maximum for his offense of conviction—this “could well be 
thought an error grave enough to warrant relief . . . a ‘fundamental error 
equivalent to actual innocence.’”77 This would be the case for § 922(g) of-
fenders. 
Part of the difficulty lies in conceptualizing what, exactly, prisoners 
sentenced under ACCA are actually innocent of. Courts could char-
acterize prisoners sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause as actually 
innocent of a particular kind of offense conduct—the pattern of “vio-
lent” crimes referenced in federal law. But it is not clear that the pattern 
of “violent” crimes referenced in federal law is part of the “offense” for 
which the defendant has been convicted.78 The defendant was convicted 
of conduct—possession of a firearm—that remains unlawful under § 
922(g), whether or not the defendant previously committed three or 
more violent crimes. Courts could instead depict these prisoners as ac-
tually innocent of their sentence because they received a punishment 
that the law as written cannot impose on them: a term of imprisonment 
exceeding ten years. But the doctrine is unclear on whether a defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012). 
 75. Id. (e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 76. E.g., Whiteside v. United States, 748 F.3d 541, 557–60 (4th Cir. 2014) (Wilkinson, 
J., dissenting) (suggesting differences between cases involving claims of federal 
constitutional error and errors of federal law and cases involving “advisory Guidelines 
determinations”), rev’d en banc, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014); Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1139 
(framing scope of procedural default in terms of whether prisoner was “sentenced below 
the statutory maximum”); Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 822–24 (framing scope of procedural 
default in terms of whether error results in “sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum 
sentence”); Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 703–04 (suggesting there are differences between cases 
involving career offender guideline and cases where “application of § 924(e)(1) . . . in-
creased the defendant’s statutory maximum sentence, which will be true with many if not 
most felon-in-possession convictions”); id. at 705 (“‘[A] sentence is not illegal . . . unless it 
exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.’” (quoting United States v. 
Stobaugh, 420 F.3d 796, 804 (8th Cir. 2005))). 
 77. Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 78. See Low & Johnson, supra note 5, at 56–57 (suggesting it is not part of offense 
conduct because it is prior crime and therefore not traditionally considered element of of-
fense). 
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may establish he is actually innocent of a noncapital sentence.79 Courts 
could instead phrase their determination in terms of “miscarriage[s] of 
justice,” and find that a miscarriage of justice occurs where “[a]n 
unlawful or illegal sentence is . . . imposed . . . in excess of[] statutory 
authority.”80 But it is unclear whether the fundamental miscarriage of 
justice exception extends to anything other than cases of actual 
innocence.81 
Despite these difficulties, there are sound reasons why courts should 
not narrow the actual innocence or fundamental miscarriage of justice 
exception such that it applies only to cases where the defendant’s conduct 
has been declared lawful or beyond the reach of criminal law. Sawyer held 
that a defendant may be actually innocent of a sentence,82 and while 
                                                                                                                           
 79. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (“[T]he miscarriage of 
justice exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.”); United 
States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1979) (distinguishing case on ground that 
“[t]he subsequent development . . . was a change in the substantive law that established 
that the conduct for which petitioner had been convicted and sentenced was lawful”). But 
this reads too much into the relevant statements, which could fairly be considered dicta. 
See, e.g., Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 344–45 (permitting defendants to establish actual innocence 
based on absence of statutory aggravating circumstances, despite statement regarding 
“actual as opposed to legal” innocence, because “[b]oth the elements of the crime and 
statutory aggravating circumstances in Louisiana are used to narrow the class of 
defendants eligible for the death penalty”); Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 186–87 (refusing to find 
actual innocence based on change in “the way in which the court’s judgment and sentence 
would be performed” in limited context of parole violation). See also infra notes 87–90 
and accompanying text (explaining why actual innocence should no longer be conceived 
solely in terms of crime of conviction). 
 80. Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705; see also Brown, 696 F.3d at 641 (“A sentence that vi-
olates a statute, as distinct from a sentence permitted by a statute though more severe than 
authorized by the guidelines, could well be thought an error grave enough to warrant 
relief in a habeas corpus proceeding—a ‘fundamental error equivalent to actual inno-
cence,’ . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 
 81. Compare, e.g., Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339 (“[T]he miscarriage of justice exception is 
concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.”), and Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
390, 404 (1993) (“This . . . fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, is grounded in 
the ‘equitable discretion’ of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not 
result in the incarceration of innocent persons.”), with Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 
428 (1962) (referring to “complete miscarriage of justice[s]” cognizable on collateral re-
view). When the Court equates fundamental miscarriages of justice with actual innocence 
it often does so to emphasize the narrowness of the exception. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (“To ensure that the fundamental miscarriage of justice ex-
ception would remain ‘rare’ and would only be applied in the ‘extraordinary case’ . . . this 
Court explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioner’s innocence.”). 
But it would not unduly expand the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to in-
clude prisoners who have been sentenced to a term exceeding the statutory maximum for 
their offense of conviction—judges rarely invalidate sentencing enhancements or statutory 
mandatory minimums on constitutional grounds. See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on 
the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1 J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 105, 129 
(1997) (noting void for vagueness doctrine rarely invoked). 
 82. See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 344–45 (permitting defendants to establish actual inno-
cence based on absence of statutory aggravating circumstances because “[b]oth the ele-
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Sawyer involved a death sentence, subsequent cases have undermined the 
extent to which various sentencing doctrines are limited to the death 
penalty context.83 The Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence also 
points in this direction. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, a jury must 
determine whether a defendant has committed each element of an 
offense.84 Early on, the Court held that any fact that makes the defendant 
eligible for a death sentence by statute is an element of the offense.85 
Subsequent cases have extended that rule to apply to noncapital 
sentences provided for by statute. Now, any fact that governs whether a 
statutory minimum sentence applies—including a noncapital additional 
term of years—is an element of the offense that must be found by a 
jury.86 
Additionally, the increasing scope of criminal law’s reach makes an 
actual innocence exception focused exclusively on conduct that has been 
declared lawful somewhat antiquated.87 Many criminal justice issues 
today, including overcriminalization, are framed in terms of the prob-
lems with lengthy sentences and mandatory minimum sentences, rather 
than with new definitions of crime.88 If one key issue in criminal law is 
that prisoners are unjustly sentenced to excessive terms of imprisonment, 
these prisoners could sensibly be thought of as innocent of their sen-
tences.89 It may have made some sense three decades ago to think of ac-
                                                                                                                           
ments of the crime and statutory aggravating circumstances in Louisiana are used to nar-
row the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty”). 
 83. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding juveniles con-
victed of homicide cannot be sentenced to life without parole); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (holding juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot be 
sentenced to life without parole); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is 
Death (Still) Different?, 11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 37, 39 (2013) (“The net-effect of ‘juveniles 
are different’ and ‘LWOP is different’ might be the functional end of ‘death is 
different.’”). 
 84. 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10, 490 (2000). 
 85. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (“Capital defendants, no less than non-
capital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which 
the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”). 
 86. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). 
 87. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev. 505, 512 (2001) (“Criminal law is both broad and deep: a great deal of conduct is 
criminalized, and of that conduct, a large proportion is criminalized many times over. I be-
lieve these propositions would be accepted by anyone who read an American criminal 
code, state or federal.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 195 
Colum. L. Rev. 1276, 1278–79 (2005) (noting “get tough” on crime rhetoric increasingly 
leads to “harsher sentences”); Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58 
Stan. L. Rev. 119, 120 (2005) (“Congress has responded to high-profile local crimes not 
only with new federal laws, but also with longer sentences for existing laws.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 
971, 990 (2010) (noting “much of America’s contemporary policy of extreme punishment 
arises from sentencing” and that “the biggest cause of overpunishment is, simply . . . ex-
cessive sentences”); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 
72 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR [Vol. 115:55 
 
tual innocence or fundamental miscarriages of justice solely in terms of 
whether a person’s conduct was criminal. But the same is not true today, 
when many think of similar criminal justice issues in terms of the sen-
tences imposed, rather than what crimes are defined by law.90 
The courts of appeals have also generally coalesced around the idea 
that a defendant would be actually innocent if a sentencing error 
resulted in the defendant receiving a sentence above the statutory 
maximum for the defendant’s offense of conviction.91 United States v. 
Pettiford is the one exception.92 There, the defendant convicted under 
§ 922(g) tried to argue he was improperly subjected to the ACCA 
enhancement in light of subsequent precedent, and maintained that his 
actual innocence provided cause to excuse his procedural default. 
Pettiford rejected the argument on the ground that actual innocence 
applies only where the defendant argues he did not commit the previous 
crimes, not to claims that the defendant’s previous crimes do not 
constitute violent felonies under ACCA.93 But even Pettiford could be read 
not to foreclose relief for prisoners sentenced under ACCA. Pettiford 
suggested the actual innocence exception was unavailable because 
defendants should not use federal collateral review to relitigate their 
prior convictions, and particularly prior state convictions.94 In Pettiford, 
the defendant sought to argue what his state conviction was “for” in light 
of various state-court documents.95 However, the claim that ACCA is 
unconstitutional does not require courts to look into what happened in 
the earlier-in-time conviction or sentencing proceedings; it concerns only 
the general validity and lawfulness of ACCA’s residual clause. Pettiford also 
stressed a defendant is not actually innocent where courts arrive at a 
                                                                                                                           
703, 718–19 (2005) (noting failure to recognize overcriminalization as “broad phenom-
enon encompassing a multiplicity of concerns” including lengthy sentences); Malcolm C. 
Young, Special Interests, Principles, and Sentencing Reform in America, 96 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 1509, 1510 (2006) (“In pursuit of a claim of near-innocence for the alleged 
victims of ‘overcriminalization,’ the authors of these chapters sidestep the central issue in 
sentencing, which is simply what amount of punishment a society should impose on 
wrongdoers.”). 
 90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting criticism of lengthy sentences); 
cf. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820, 825 
(1994) (urging scholars to think about scope of various criminal procedure doctrines in 
terms of “historical changes” and “changes in law enforcement institutions”). 
 91. See supra note 76 (discussing these cases). 
 92. 612 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2010); see supra note 73 (listing cases where statutory max-
imum exceeded erroneous sentence). The analysis in the preceding paragraphs arguably 
suggests Pettiford was wrongly decided. 
 93. 612 F.3d at 284. 
 94. Id. at 282 (“To begin with, a federal sentencing proceeding is not ordinarily an 
appropriate forum in which to challenge the validity of a prior state conviction.”). 
 95. See Brief of Appellee at 19–22, United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270 (2010) 
(No. 09-4119) 2009 WL 4396281 (relying on charging documents and statement of 
probable cause to challenge grounds of conviction). 
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mistaken “legal classification” of the defendant’s predicate crimes.96 But 
the claim that ACCA is unconstitutionally vague is not an argument 
about a mistaken legal classification; it is an argument about an invalid 
and unenforceable one. 
2. Prisoners Sentenced Under the Career Offender Guideline. — The 
equitable roots of procedural default may lead some to think the fun-
damental miscarriage of justice exception also applies to defendants sen-
tenced under the career offender guideline, thus excusing these defen-
dants’ procedural default. Procedural default is an equitable doctrine, 
and when the doctrine applies to federal prisoners, it is rooted only in 
concerns of finality rather than comity or federalism (as is the case when 
the doctrine applies to state prisoners).97 But there are considerable costs 
to permitting every defendant sentenced under the career offender 
guideline to obtain resentencing in light of Johnson, and the doctrine 
likely forecloses these prisoners’ ability to obtain relief. 
The equities may be different in cases where a defendant was sen-
tenced under a guideline whose language is unconstitutionally vague 
than in cases where a defendant was sentenced under a misinterpretation 
of the Guidelines. Consider the different finality interests in these two 
kinds of cases. Many decisions maintain collateral review is unavailable 
for Guidelines errors because every Guidelines application affects the de-
fendant’s sentence, so every case (re)interpreting the Guidelines could 
require resentencing hundreds or thousands of defendants.98 These fears 
may have been especially acute in cases involving the career offender 
guideline, which was constantly in flux in light of the Supreme Court 
cases reinterpreting ACCA. However, courts rarely find Federal 
Sentencing Guideline language to be unconstitutionally vague. For a 
court to reach that conclusion, the Guidelines language must appear 
word for word in a criminal statute, and a court must find that statute 
void for vagueness. And applying the fundamental miscarriage of justice 
exception to cases where defendants were sentenced under a guideline 
whose language has been declared unconstitutionally vague would not 
necessarily mean the exception applies to any case involving an incorrect 
interpretation or application of the Guidelines. 
                                                                                                                           
 96. 612 F.3d at 284. 
 97. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (“The rules for when a 
prisoner may establish cause to excuse a procedural default are elaborated in the exercise 
of the Court’s discretion. These rules reflect . . . equitable judgment[s].”); United States v. 
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982) (establishing cause-and-prejudice standard for federal 
prisoners); cf. Kendall Turner, Note, A New Approach to the Teague Doctrine, 66 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1159, 1173–74 (2014) (arguing federalism and comity considerations do not justify 
Teague’s application to federal prisoners on federal collateral review). 
 98. Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1144 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[F]inality is a 
concern . . . for a first motion to vacate a sentence”); Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 
180, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting 80,000 prisoners sentenced each year); Hawkins v. 
United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013) (same). 
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However, it is unlikely that many courts will conclude the funda-
mental miscarriage of justice exception allows defendants sentenced un-
der the career offender guideline to be resentenced in light of Johnson. 
Several decisions suggest the actual innocence exception is categorically 
unavailable for Guidelines errors where the defendant received a sen-
tence below the statutory maximum applicable to his offense.99 Addi-
tionally, although the interests in finality are less powerful in cases 
involving unconstitutionally vague guidelines, they are still substantial: 
Many more defendants are subjected each year to the career offender 
guideline than to ACCA—approximately 2,000 offenders each year re-
ceive the career offender guideline enhancement, whereas only 600 
offenders each year are sentenced under ACCA.100 Courts would there-
fore have to resentence thousands of more defendants if courts conclude 
that defendants sentenced under the career offender guideline qualify as 
actually innocent for purposes of procedural default. 
C. Statute of Limitations 
Section 2255(f) establishes a one-year statute of limitations for filing 
a petition for collateral review which runs from the later of two dates: the 
date on which the conviction became final, or “the date on which the 
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right 
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review.” The retroactivity analysis sug-
gests prisoners’ petitions for collateral review would be timely if the 
prisoner files the petition within a year of a decision holding ACCA’s re-
sidual clause unconstitutional.101 The circuits agree the statute of limi-
tations is restarted under § 2255(f) when the Supreme Court recognizes 
the right, even if the Court does not explicitly make the right retro-
active.102 Additionally, AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled for claims 
                                                                                                                           
 99. Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704–05 (8th Cir. 2011) (suggesting 
Guidelines errors are not cognizable on collateral review because they do not result in sen-
tences “in excess of[] statutory authority”); United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 462 
(6th Cir. 2001) (“Courts have generally declined to collaterally review sentences that fall 
within the statutory maximum.”). 
 100. Guidelines estimates suggest over 2,000 offenders each year are subjected to the 
career offender guideline. This number does not differentiate between defendants con-
victed of unlawful firearms possession in violation of § 922(g) rather than other offenses. 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Quick Facts: Career Offender, available at http:// 
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Quick_Facts_Career_Offender.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2015). 
 101. Cf. Whiteside, 775 F.3d at 183–85 (holding court of appeals decision regarding 
ACCA did not constitute “facts supporting the claim or claims presented” restarting limi-
tations period if decision was not retroactively applicable under § 2255(f)(4)). 
 102. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding peti-
tion timely because it was filed within one year of decision court of appeals found retro-
actively applicable); Fischer v. United States, 285 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding 
statute of limitations begins even though it is “[d]istrict and appellate court[] . . . opinions 
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of actual innocence.103 Thus, if Johnson means that prisoners sentenced 
under ACCA’s residual clause are actually innocent, their actual in-
nocence could excuse their untimely petitions for collateral review. 
III. GROUP THREE: PRISONERS ON SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS FOR 
COLLATERAL REVIEW 
The greatest barrier to relief may be the one applicable to a third 
category of prisoners—prisoners whose convictions have become final 
and who have previously filed at least one petition for review under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255. But even this provision could be interpreted to allow pri-
soners sentenced under ACCA to obtain relief through second or suc-
cessive petitions for collateral review. Indeed, several courts of appeals 
have interpreted the provision to allow prisoners to raise claims that they 
were mistakenly sentenced as a career offender under ACCA. 
AEDPA greatly limits the availability of second or successive petitions 
for collateral review: Prisoners may only file a second or successive pe-
tition where a panel certifies that newly discovered evidence proves the 
defendant innocent of the offense, or certifies there is “a new rule of 
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”104 Unlike the statute of 
limitations applicable to initial petitions for collateral review, the gateway 
to second petitions for collateral review opens only once the rule was 
made retroactive by the Supreme Court.105 This would mean that prisoners 
subjected to ACCA’s sentencing enhancement could only file second or 
successive petitions once the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes that its 
decision invalidating ACCA’s residual clause applies retroactively.106 
                                                                                                                           
‘holding’ that a decision applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.”); cf. United 
States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 696, 626–28 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding statute of limitations re-
started once Begay was decided); Lindsey v. United States, 615 F.3d 998, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 
2010) (suggesting same); Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 413–15 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(same). 
 103. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). Although McQuiggin specifi-
cally concerned the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, there is little reason to think 
it would be tolled for innocence under that provision, which is applicable to state pri-
soners, but not under § 2255, which is applicable to federal prisoners. 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012). 
 105. E.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001) (interpreting similarly worded 
provision in § 2244, which is applicable to state-court prisoners, in this way); In re Jackson, 
776 F.3d 292, 293 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (stating statute of limitations restarts only if 
litigant identifies “‘a Supreme Court decision that either expressly declares the collateral 
availability of the rule . . . or applies the rule in a collateral proceeding’”). 
 106. This assumes the Court does not state or make the rule retroactively applicable 
to collateral review in Johnson, which it could only do in dicta. It is unclear whether the 
Court could “make” a rule retroactive for purposes of the statute of limitations through 
dicta. Tyler arguably suggests it could not: “The only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, 
‘lay out and construct’ a rule’s retroactive effect, or ‘cause’ that effect ‘to exist, occur, or 
appear,’ is through a holding.” 553 U.S. at 663. 
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There is, however, another avenue these prisoners may use to obtain 
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 authorizes federal courts to grant writs of habeas 
corpus, and § 2241 does not contain any of the limitations applicable to 
petitions for review under § 2255. However, there are limits on when pri-
soners may use § 2241 to evade § 2255’s limitations: Section 2255(e) (the 
“savings clause”) only permits prisoners to utilize § 2241 where “the re-
medy [provided by § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality 
of [the prisoner’s] detention.” 
Section 2255(e)’s savings clause permits prisoners sentenced under 
ACCA who have already filed one petition for collateral review to obtain 
relief under § 2241. Section 2255’s limitations on second or successive 
petitions mean that defendants sentenced under ACCA will linger in pri-
son—possibly for a term of imprisonment that exceeds the statutory max-
imum for their offense—because they must wait to file a petition for 
collateral review until the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes that 
Johnson applies retroactively.107 That makes the § 2255 remedy nonexis-
tent—and thus inadequate or ineffective—to test the legality of these 
prisoners’ detentions.108 However narrow the savings clause may be, it 
should, at a minimum, allow defendants to obtain relief where they were 
subjected to an unconstitutionally vague mandatory sentencing enhance-
ment that resulted in a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum for 
their offense of conviction. 
The few cases interpreting the savings clause confirm this intuition. 
Moore v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium held that § 2255’s limitations on 
second or successive petitions made the § 2255 remedy inadequate for a 
defendant who was mistakenly subjected to the ACCA enhancement in 
light of subsequent precedent.109 Indeed, in several cases “the govern-
ment concede[d] that a claim that a sentencing error [that] resulted in a 
sentence longer than the statutory maximum may be brought in an 
initial § 2255 motion or, if that remedy is foreclosed by § 2255(h), in a 
§ 2241 petition by virtue of the savings clause.”110 Even cases finding the 
savings clause inapplicable—thus preventing recourse to § 2241—note 
that the savings clause permits litigants to sidestep § 2255(h)’s limitations 
on second or successive petitions “[w]hen a change of law, retroactively 
applicable, shows that a prisoner . . . has received an illegally high sen-
                                                                                                                           
 107. The Court could conceivably do so either implicitly or explicitly (in dicta) in 
Johnson. See supra note 106 (discussing Court’s capabilities in this area).  
 108. Some may think this creates an impermissible work-around to Tyler’s rule that 
the Supreme Court must make a rule retroactive before a second or successive petition is 
permitted. But § 2241 is an explicit workaround to limitations contained in § 2255, as 
§ 2255(e) specifies. 
 109. 568 F. App’x 838, 840–41 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 110. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also 
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The government has conceded that 
Brown can use the habeas corpus statute to challenge the legality of his sentence.”); cf. 
Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1274, 1277–79 (11th Cir. 2013) (allowing claim that de-
fendant was wrongly sentenced under ACCA to proceed under § 2241). 
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tence.”111 This would be the case for defendants convicted under 
§ 922(g) and sentenced under ACCA: Without the ACCA enhancement, 
the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for a § 922(g) conviction 
is ten years, but ACCA requires a minimum term of fifteen years’ 
imprisonment. 
The same may not be true for defendants who were subjected to the 
career offender guideline’s enhancement. Gilbert v. United States held that 
a prisoner could not challenge his sentence under § 2241 where a misin-
terpretation of the career offender guideline resulted in a sentence that 
did not exceed the statutory maximum for the defendant’s offense of 
conviction.112 Although a decision finding a guideline’s language uncon-
stitutionally vague may be different from a decision reinterpreting a 
guideline, it is unclear if that difference allows prisoners to make use of 
the savings clause.113 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Some of the issues raised by a decision invalidating ACCA’s residual 
clause require some further analysis. In addition to the three categories 
of defendants discussed in this Essay, there is a fourth category of prison-
ers who may seek relief in the event of a favorable decision in Johnson: 
Defendants who pled guilty to other offenses in the shadow of the ACCA 
enhancement, believing the enhancement was both valid and applied to 
their case.114 It is not clear whether these prisoners will be able to obtain 
relief based on a favorable decision in Johnson. It is not particularly well 
established when a plea deal is invalid on the ground that the defendant 
entered into the agreement based on a mistaken belief about the law.115 
Given that over ninety-six percent of federal defendants plead guilty, 
whether these defendants may obtain relief may be the real test of 
Johnson’s significance.116 
*** 
                                                                                                                           
 111. Webster v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2014), vacated by order granting 
reh’g en banc, 769 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 112. 640 F.3d at 1293. 
 113. Brown, 696 F.3d at 641 (suggesting availability of relief under § 2241 depends on 
whether defendant argues there has been a guideline or statutory error). 
 114. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Guns And Drugs 31–52 (Feb. 25, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting ACCA creates incentives to 
plea); see also Ethan Davis, Comment, The Sentence Imposed Versus the Statutory 
Maximum: Repairing the Armed Career Criminal Act, 118 Yale L.J. 369, 377 (2008) 
(same). 
 115. E.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618–19 (1998) (suggesting plea 
would be invalid if defendant showed “that neither he, nor his counsel, nor the court cor-
rectly understood the elements of the crime with which he was charged”); United States v. 
Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding plea invalid because defendant mistakenly 
believed he preserved speedy trial objection). 
 116. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
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The order directing the parties in Johnson to address whether ACCA 
is unconstitutionally vague has positioned the Court to dramatically 
affect federal sentencing. Federal sentencing reports estimate the aver-
age sentence for offenders who qualified as armed career criminals but 
were not subject to the ACCA’s enhancement was 122 months’ impris-
onment, whereas offenders who received the enhancement were sen-
tenced to an average 210 months’ imprisonment—a difference of over 
seven years.117 And as the introduction mentioned, ACCA is a flashpoint 
for many of the modern issues in criminal law.118 
In addition to the prisoners who may or would have been sentenced 
under ACCA, a favorable decision in Johnson should also significantly af-
fect those who have already been sentenced under ACCA. A decision fin-
ding ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutional, will raise a multitude of 
questions about various statutes and doctrines that govern resentencing. 
But these statutes and doctrines should not bar prisoners who have been 
sentenced under ACCA from obtaining relief based on a favorable deci-
sion in Johnson. Prisoners on direct review, first collateral review, and even 
successive collateral review all possess colorable arguments for resen-
tencing should the Court find the residual clause of ACCA void for 
vagueness. 
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 117. Mandatory Minimum Penalties, supra note 6, at 292. 
 118. Id.; see also Levin, supra note 114, at 31–52 (collecting research describing 
ACCA’s effects). 
